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Abstract  
The conduct of monetary policy and its results are essential for the post-crisis economy. History shows that monetary policy 
mistakes are not unusual and problems may arise from misunderstandings and lack of control over the impact of monetary 
authorities' actions. Also, there is no consensus from either academic or professional point of views over the origins of crises and 
how they should be avoided or dealed with. The aim of this paper is to identify the first controversies over money, monetary rules 
and  financial crises, and demonstrate they haven't changed much since they were publicly debated in  the 19th century.   
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of Faculty of Economic Sciences, Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu. 
Keywords: monetary policy; monetary theory; central banking; financial crisis. 
1. Introduction 
Presently, one takes for granted the existence of a modern central bank who operates the monetary policy in a 
given state. But not so long ago (namely 150 years ago), this institutional arrangement didn't exist in the shape we 
know it today, and the prototypes of central banks were few among the states of Europe. A central bank holds 
monopoly over the money supply, manages the international reserves of the state, regulates the banking system, and 
sometimes the finanacial system as well. The central banker is the one who through discretionary monetary 
management decides the general interest rate and to whom he should be lender of last resort. The 2008 financial 
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is seen as generating moral-hazard and leading to worse results for the post-crisis economy.   
As opposed to the present institutional arrangements, free banking means that the system would comprise of 
competitive banks, all possessing equal rights to trade (Smith, 1936): the currency unit would be an asset or a set of 
assets and commercial banks would have notes and deposits convertible in the currency unit as liabilities (Goodhart, 
1992). Any bank would be free to trade notes acording to its assets, competing with other banks in money creation.  
The post-crisis debates tackle subjects such as the functioning of central banking, what is considered to be 
money, how does monetary policy influence the overall economy and how should it be conducted. The topics are 
similar to the ones discussed in the Currency School- Banking School controversy, as we shall see. Today, 
economists and policy makers are in considerable disagreement over the issues mentioned above. 
Monetary theory was approached in the past by many scholars, among them David Hume, Adam Smith and 
David Ricardo to name the early theoretician who are best known. 
2. Still, the dispute over what exactly money is and how should the monetary and banking systems be organized 
that deserves to be mentioned as a starting point for modern times dates back in the 19th century, in England and in 
ecially in France (Smith, 1936). 
But as most of historians of economic thought approach the subject, the central question was whether the monetary 
policies should be governed by rules (endorsed by adherents of the Currency School) or by discretionary decisions 
(endorsed by adherents of the Banking School) (Schwartz, 2008; Smith, 1936). The debate in England (it is of 
interest because the development of modern central banking occurred there) concerns the reform of the Bank of 
England (known also as the Bank) and the famous dispute between the Currency School and the Banking School 
around 1840s. The latter brought valuable insights regarding monetary theory and policy which will be the focus of 
this paper.  
2. The 19th century banking system and the controversy of the Currency School and the Banking School 
debate; problems of interpretation 
First of all, let us make some comments regarding the banking system in England during the 19th century. The 
Bank of England (privately owned with limited liability) had monopoly over note issuing in London and its vicinity 
(65 mile radius) and was the only one to be allowed joint-stock of more than 6 partners in England and Wales, until 
1826. Thus, the Country banks (outside London's perimeter), who could issue notes, with some restrictions, were not 
entitled to the same conditions regarding joint-stock while the other London banks would only play the role of 
money intermediation - deposit and credit creation, being restricted also to a maximum of 6 partners (Arnon, 2011; 
Goodhart, 2008; Smith, 1936). The Parliament regulations of 1777 who raised the minimum denomination for any 
non-
England notes as the dominant form of 
Wales (Goodhart, 2008). Plus, all the privileges the government had given through the periodically renewed Bank's 
Charters had transformed the Bank, little by little, in the holder of the gold and banking reserves (i.e, reserve against 
notes, and reserve against deposits, respectively,) for the entire England, as Vera Smith concludes. We must not 
forget that at that moment, the monetary system was based on silver and gold as the standard for money, all other 
paper money being redeemable in silver or gold coins and bullion. There had been periods of suspension of 
convertibility of the Bank's notes 3 (not of the Country banks' notes as well) during banking crises in England, but 
this was the exception from the rule. So the system at the time was a hybrid one  neither complete monopoly over 
money creation (central banking), neither free competition among banks in the trade of note issue (free banking). 
 
 
2 although the role of money was discussed in the works of Plato or Aristotle in the 4th century BCE, the issue probably arose long time before 
them. 
3 Basically, the British monetary system was put on a paper standard 
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The result of the currency-banking controversy was the adoption of the Bank Charter Act of 1844, known as 
Peel's Act (the name of Britain's Prime Minister at that moment) and was seen as a victory of the Currency School. 
t of the ultimate monopoly over paper money 
creation in the hands of the Bank (Schwartz, 2008; Smith 1936)  it prohibited new banks to issue notes, restricted 
the issue of all existing private and joint stock country banks to their average circulation and separated the two 
functions of Bank of England, note issue and credit intermediation, in two departments  the Issue Department and 
the Banking Department who would operate separately (Arnon, 2011; Goodhart, 2008; Schwartz, 2008; Skaggs, 
1999; Smith, 1936). Also, the Act placed a 100 percent marginal reserve requirement on the issue of Bank of 
England notes -  the Bank's fiduciary issue was limited to  £14 million and any notes issued above this level would 
be in exchange for gold coin or bullion (Skaggs, 1999).  
Most of the authors, such as Anna Schwartz, Lawrence White, Charles Goodhart (who actually approaches the 
subject by resuming White's point of view) or Arie Arnon add to the two before-mentioned Schools the Free-
Banking School as a third school involved in the debates at that time. But Vera Smith notes in her doctoral thesis 
that advocates of free-banking can actually be considered as taking sides either of the Currency School or of the 
Banking School, whether they promoted near 100% reserves or wanted monetary inflation and cheap credit. Thus, 
she groups the chief disputants in the banking and currency controversy as being in favour of free-banking or central 
banking, resulting 4 different categories of monetary thinking. While Smith emphasises the free-banking 
controversy, in the secondary literature the discussions on extending free trade to banking (especially note issuing) 
occupy little space in comparison to the dispute between the two former mentioned schools over the organisation of 
the Bank and the meaning of money, as we will see further on. 
The ante -1840s debates had been related to the paper notes convertibility in specie (coins or gold/silver bullions) 
but the successive financial crises of 1825, 1832 and 1836 determined public discussions of monetary issues such as 
monetary fluctuations, the monetary system or the Bank of England's responsibility for the fragility of the system. 
The Currency School and its representatives (Samuel Jones Loyd,  J.R. McCulloch, Robert Torrens, George Ward 
Norman etc.) believed that the crises had been attributable to the monetary mismanagement of the Bank of England 
and advocated for a reform  which succeeded to be applied in 1844 through the adoption of Peel's Act, while the 
Banking School,  represented by Thomas Tooke, John Fullarton, James Wilson and others, emerged as a reaction to 
the pamphlets written by Loyd or Torrens, had other opinions and supported more or less the current state of affairs 
 Tooke was for competition outside London, monopoly over note issue inside it (Arnon, 2011). Wilson rather 
favoured free competition and thought banking altogether (note issue and intermediation) should obey the market 
forces as any other trade (Smith, 1936). Goodhart (1989) and Schwartz (2008) consider that as a whole, the Banking 
School agreed with the Currency School on the need to establish a Central Bank  as opposed to the Free-Banking 
School. Others, alternatively, interpreted it as supporting competition in money creation (Skaggs, 1999).  
It is my opinion that the various (sometimes even opposing) views in secondary literature with regard to the 
defining principles of each School differ precisely because of the many important personalities of that time who 
endorsed different theories. Here comes of great help Vera Smith's analysis who used a 2x2 grid in categorising the 
monetary writers  currency school and banking school on one side (meaning they backed a 100% gold reserve for 
banknotes or a fractional-reserve system), and free banking and central banking on the other (equaling a system 
based  on monetary competition or, on the contrary, one based on monopoly over paper money creation). As such, 
one can be a supporter of the Currency School's attempts to limit note overissuing and, at the same time, be a 
sympathiser of the monetary competition (although the general opinion is that the Currency School was an advocate 
of central banking). The above is valid for the Banking School as well  one can favour the trade of note issue 
governed by discretion and be at the same time an advocate of central banking or free-banking. Skaggs (1999) also 
makes a review of the multiple investigations of the British controversy and reasons that the dispute gained several 
interpretations and positions as a result of the authors'  different sympathies or received theory during their academic 
education. Still, we may say that the prevailing Currency School's opinions were incorporated in Peel's Act in 1844, 
ool had no legislative programme for 
(Schwartz, 2008). Still, why the lack of legislative programme among the Banking School's proponents who actually 
only reacted to the Currency's School proposals? The answer will become clear once one follows the debate more 
closely. 
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3. The dispute over the role of money and money supply and discretion versus regulations 
To begin with, the majority of  the Currency School's members (not all of them, but this was the view that 
prevailed and was incorporated in Peel's Act in 1844) assumed that the money supply included notes (paper money) 
4 and coins (metallic money)  and that overissuing of bank notes (whether done by the Bank or otherwise ) was at 
the heart of monetary instability (Arnon, 2011; Goodhart, 1989, Schwartz, 2008). They did not deny the importance 
of other credit instruments, but considered them to be determined by the quantity of currency in circulation (Arnon, 
2011; Skaggs, 1999). The Banking School claimed that the overall rate of expansion of bank assets and liabilities 
was the element important to monetary stability (Goodhart, 1989) and  that other forms of credit (bills of exchange, 
Exchequer bills or cheques) were similar to, and should be treated the same way as bank notes. Therefore the 
definition of money should include, besides notes and coins, deposits payable on demand (Arnon 2011; Smith, 
1936).  Instead, Anna Schwartz (2008) reaches the conclusion that the Banking's School definition of money was 
means of raising the velocity of bank vault cash but not as adding to the quantity of mone
contrasting point of views has been explained in the preceding section.  
The Currency School accepted the classical quantity theory of money -in its view the prices were being 
influenced by the supply of money. Thus a shortage of money would result in declining prices, while an excess 
would increase them. Changing the quantity of money in the system would not affect relative prices and real 
variables such as output or employment because the nominal prices would adjust to the  money supply promptly, 
without any impact on the real economy (the so called neutrality of money). Its proponents also included in their 
theoretical explanations the Price-Specie-Flow mechanism first described by David Hume. Accordingly, countries 
who are trade partners will pay one another in internationally accepted money and so the inflow or outflow of gold  
will join or leave the internal money circulation. The result would be maintaing the equilibrium of the balance of 
payments in the long run through automatic forces. Then, the Currency principle  implied that the circulation of 
notes will expand and contract at the same time with gold bullion and its evolution ( in Skaggs 
mixed (metallic and paper) currency should fluctuate exactly as a purely metallic currency would), as the perfect 
n reserve under a 
mixed currency 5
banking activities (deposits and loans) as they considered there is no need in that direction.  
Last but not least, most of the School's advocates tried to explain why the classical principle of competition could 
not be applied to the trade of note issue, and why a central authority should be established holding monopoly over 
issuing of notes (Arnon 2011; Smith, 1936; Huerta de Soto, 2010). As mentioned before, only a minority supported 
free banking instead. Past experience had shown that monetary instability was closely related to the fact that banks 
were inclined to issue more notes than their gold reserves would have allowed them to do. Therefore, what the 
Currency School was trying to do may be interpreted as the setting up of a monetary system based on 100% 
reserves, in which any change in the bullion reserves would be followed by a change in the circulation. As noted by 
Arnon (2011), Goodhart (1989) or Huerta de Soto (2010), the exponents of the Currency School failed to see that 
deposits played and important role in money creation, and, hence, even after the implementation of Peel's Act, an 
Act which did not impose any requirements upon deposits payable on demand but included the School's 
recommendations on paper money creation, the financial crises kept recurring.  
As such, one of the arguments for central banking and against free-banking regarded money creation as operating 
in the interest of the nation, not for profit as it did currently, and that one authority should be responsible for the 
money supply. Free-banking would mean a dissolution of this responsibility. Plus, in a free-banking system, there 
would be no mechanism against overissuing of notes if banks decided to expand together, as it had happened before 
in the past (Arnon, 2011). Loyd, for example, was of the opinion that the results of the miscalculations of the note-
 
 
4 They included government paper money and bank notes 
5 Meaning metallic and paper money 
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issuers were negatively affecting the public, while banks borne no loss. Also, he believed that the ordinary rule of 
producing the greatest quantity  at the cheapest price did not apply in the case of currency , and therefore, it should 
not be treated as any other trades (Schwartz, 2008). Further on, members of the Currency School argued that a 
monopoly over note-
t time. The same did 
not apply for  all the other banking transactions, thus competition would be allowed in ordinary banking business. 
Also, this rationale was used in separating the Bank of England's activities in two departments through Peel's Act of 
1844 (because its two functions were conflicting)  the Banking Department would function as any other 
commercial bank, maximizing  its profit, while in times of distress (when clients would come to demand their 
deposits) it would not have the right to apply for notes or gold at the Issue department as it had done many times 
before, but it would use its own reserves (Arnon, 2011). Thus, in the future the fluctuations of money would be 
according to the fluctuations of coins and bullion reserves. 
Having such an important role in the economy of a country, the trade of note-issuing was considered to be of 
public interest by important proponents of the Banking School as well. They favoured a system based on a big 
reserve of bullion (but they didn't mention its volume), managed by the Bank, who would be able to deal with 
temporary bullion drains without destabilizing credit markets (Arnon, 2011, Skaggs, 1999).  Tooke, for example, 
y because it would hold 
resonated, the other proposals of the Currency School were challenged by the Banking School through their 
writings.  
As we have seen before, they disagreed on the importance of deposits - the Banking School paid greater attention 
to financial assets convertible into gold (Goodhart, 1989; Skaggs, 1999), and considered other forms of credit as 
behaving in a similar way to bank notes. Thus they tried to demonstrate that the currency principle and the price-
specie-flow mechanism were flawed from the start (as it took into consideration only coins and paper money) and, 
moreover, they accused the Currency School of accepting two easily the Quantity Theory (Arnon, 2011). Tooke, an 
exponent of the Banking School, considered that money was actually influenced by prices and income, not the other 
way round (i.e. the amount of money is determining prices), and that the money supply was influenced by public 
behaviour, not by gold flows or trade. Therefore, the money instruments were being controlled by market forces and 
banks of issues could not determine the amount of notes in circulation. Thus, the banks could not be accused of 
overissuing (Arnon, 2011).  As Vera Smith (1936) mentions, the group believed that the activity of note-issuing was 
determined by the demand of the public, and the amount of the note issue should not be imposed through legal 
restrictions. 
A Banking School principle, stated by both Fullarton and Tooke, was the law of reflux according to which 
convertible notes would return to the issuer in the form of deposits, for repayment of loans or for redemption in 
metallic money,  if he were to try to issue too many of them (in the first two cases bringing an end to overissue, in 
the third  draining the gold reserves of the bank ), making overissue possible only for limited periods of time 
(Arnon, 2011; Schwartz, 2008). The explanations were in support of not regulating money, and leaving it at the 
discretion of banks or the Bank. 
Also, in Schwartz's account (2008) of the Banking School's history, there are two other main principles 
mentioned: the real bills doctrine, according to which  loans which finance short term  commercial transactions do 
 
- therefore the Currency School was right and the real bills doctrine did not 
prevent overi -determined  curtailed 
- the 
money supply would expand or contract to meet the needs of trade without being a source of economic  instability. 
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4. The Lessons of the Currency School-Banking School debate for the post-crisis economy 
The Currency-Banking Schools dispute can help us trace important problems on which consensus hasn't been 
reached even today and, at the same time, gives us the key to understand central banking evolution. The main issues 
were: what is money, how should money be created (through competition or through monopoly) and what should be 
the conduct of a monetary authority  monetary policy based on rules or on discretion? Even more, although 
monetary policy has evolved since the 19th century, many of its tools and principles were developed then (Bordo, 
2008). 
Thus, first to arise is the issue of money. In the 19th century the system was based on commodity money -
meaning that currency (in the form of coins) was being minted out of gold especially (silver became less and less 
used) and its value was closely linked to the international price of gold and to the reserves of gold a country 
possessed. All notes issued by banks and government (paper money) were redeemable in currency or in bullion. 
Some economists, for example Tobin (2008), emphasize the role of social convention in designating the value and 
the functi
institution. Based on Menger's previous work, 
according to which the  money demand originates from the moment money had purchasing power as a non-
monetary commodity in barter. Therefore, money  isn't  just a simple convention, it has intrinsic value and emerges 
as social institution  in time and following  intense human interaction- commercial exchange.  
Paradoxically, today the monetary unit is defined by government, the central authority deciding what media are 
legal tender in the settlement of debts, contracts and other payments as well. The currency is fiat, without intrinsic 
interest for it (and has virtually no assets to back it). The institution of money is considered a public good which 
cannot be produced on the free market without government control for this reason (Tobin, 2008), although history 
show us the evolution of money as a social institution, not as a governmental creation. 
Leaving aside the differences between commodity money and fiat money, what the Currency-Banking School 
dispute brings forth is valuable insight on the money's and its derivatives' role in the economy. The Banking School 
disapproved of the Currency's School explanations in which only notes (paper money) were considered of 
importance. Bank notes were similar to other forms of credit such as demand deposits, bills of exchange, cheques, 
exchequer bills -therefore why not include them in the theoretical debate? Moreover, the Currency School believed 
that the financial crises of their century were the result of bank notes overissue (without even considering the role of 
deposits on demand). Instead, according to the 20th century Austrian Business Cycle Theory, demand deposits in a 
fractional-reserve banking system are the source of financial crises. Non-Austrian economists as well, such as Lucas 
(2011) have observed, that during the Great Depression (1929-1933) what changed in the USA was not the 
occurrence of war or a natural disaster, not even the American ability to produce (and thus, its potential GDP), but 
the decline in deposits, and, consequentially, a decrease in liquidity. Or, a fractional-reserve banking system will be 
fragile in these conditions and bank-runs will lead to financial crises. Concluding, deposits on demand play an 
important part in today's money, besides the fiat currency created by monetary authorities, because it is through 
them (and the legal provisions governing them) that the fractional-reserve banking system gives power to 
commercial banks to multiply money in the economy. 
The result of the ambiguity about the precise definition of money is that, presently, economists and central 
bankers use monetary aggregates comprising of different money derivatives to refer to  money 6. Hence base money 
(sometimes referred as M0 or monetary base) is defined as the the currency in circulation and the reserves held by 
credit institutions (banks and other depository institutions) at the central bank in their country. The official definition 
of narrow money, M1, includes currency in circulation  and overnight deposits (the Fed specifies currency held by 
the public and transaction deposits at depository institutions - including traveler's checks, demand deposits and other 
checkable deposits). M2, a monetary aggregate as well, comprises M1 plus deposits with an agreed maturity of up to 
 
 
6 The definitions have been harmonized according to information given on the official websites of the ECB, Fed, and OECD 
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two years and deposits redeemable at notice of up to three months (while the Fed take into account M1 plus savings 
deposits, small-denomination time deposits  issued in amount of less than $100,000-, and retail money market 
mutual fund shares). Broad money, M3, is in the OECD and ECB views, the sum of M2, repurchase agreements, 
money market fund shares and units and debt securities with a maturity of up to two years. Unlike the European 
Central Bank, the Federal Reserve System decided the cease of publication of the M3 monetary aggregate starting 
from March 23, 2006 as it had lost its importance in the conduct of monetary policy.  
The following figure illustrates the tremendous difference between the monetary base, created by Fed in the U.S., 
and the monetary aggregate M2. The latter aggregate shows the contribution of private banks to money creation, 
multiplying money through the fractional reserve system. This leads to the conclusion that central banks cannot 
actually control the real supply of money in the economy, as it depends on the banking system (after it has complied 
with capitalization requirements and reserves requirements) to what extent it will lend money (and, thus, multiply 
it). The support for lending, besides time deposits, are the demand deposits (consisting of monetary base) and the 
two quantitative easing programmes launched by Fed  QE1 and QE2 can be seen as pushing up  the monetary base 
(resembling two cliffs).     
 
 
 
  
Fig. 1. Monetary aggregates Evolution in the U.S. 
 Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
   
Still, the result has not been the one wished by Fed. Figure 1 clearly shows an anomaly: the monetary base is 
larger than the monetary aggregate M1. This could mean that the money injections are not effective, as the banks 
prefer to keep even higher reserves with Fed.   
As regards to GDP growth following Fed's actions, the results are inconclusive. Figure 2 illustrates the change in 
its evolution, in percentages. There is a slight positive trend, but as it can be seen, GDP doesn't seem to register a 
stable growth. On the contrary. 
 
 
55 Irina Mădălina Doroftei /  Procedia Economics and Finance  6 ( 2013 )  48 – 56 
 
 
Fig. 2. Gross Domestic Product percent change in the U.S. 
 Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
5. Conclusions  
Although the earliest predecessor to monetary policy can be considered the process of debasement (Bordo, 2008), 
the major issue of monetary conduct arose during the Currency School-Banking School debate. As mentioned 
before, many believed that mismanagement of money and of notes issued by Bank of England and other country 
banks led to the financial crises of the 19th century in England. It was then when the need of rules replacing 
discretionary issuing of notes was first discussed (and applied through Peel's Act of 1844). The currency principle 
meant that notes should be issued based on a strict convertibility to gold and should behave as a metallic currency 
(thus the volume of gold inflows and outflows in a country would affect the quantity of paper money directly). As 
opposed, the banking principle assumed that the volume of paper money follows the demand of the public. Thus the 
banks should issue notes backed by real bills (loans based on short-term commercial transactions), and not 
necessarily gold, leaving room to discretionary conduct. In time, the currency principle proved to be flawed because 
it did not prevent overissue of notes (based on demand deposits who weren't taken in consideration by most of the 
Currency School advocates) and financial crises repeated, while the real-bills doctrine was discredited years later, in 
the US, as its inflationary results harmed the economy. 
At the end of this both historical and theoretical exposition, there is a simple and clear conclusion in my view. 
Thus, while entrepreneurs and households change their financial plans regarding investments, spendings or savings 
at their own expenses, central banking has been experimenting and exploring the outcomes of monetary policy at the 
expenses of the local tax payer. The negative impact upon our economy has never been totally assessed, and 
sometimes central bankers have resigned for their alleged mistakes. But in fact, central banks operate the monetary 
policy without knowing exactly what the outcome will be, and without paying for possible errors of policy. 
The Currency School  Monetary School debate touched upon several sensitive matters which were not fully 
understood at that time. Although the Currency School had been well-intended and had an intuition regarding the 
relationship between financial crises and note over issue, wishing to introduce rules instead of discretion in 
monetary affairs, most of its proponents made two fundamental mistakes: first, they believed that a monopoly over 
money creation would lead to more responsible note issuing and more stability in the economy (which did not 
happen). Second, it did not take into account the important role demand deposits played in the process of money 
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creation and their multiplier effect. From this point of view, the Monetary School was closer to the truth, by pointing 
out the similar purposes of notes, cheques, bills of exchange and other forms of credit. But the Monetary School had 
been advocating for discretion, wishing to leave the banks use fractional reserves as they wished. This meant the 
banks would seek even higher profits, by lending money under the form of bank notes for which they did not have 
gold to back them (thus multiplying the amount of notes in circulation). Even though they were risking bank runs, as 
a result of a non 100% reserve. Their main argument was that money was influenced by public's behaviour, i.e. 
prices and income, and banks (or governments) could not determine the amount of notes in circulation.  
not keep 100 percent gold reserves against the outstanding claims upon them, and that they could lend their 
certificates to merchants promising to deliver gold later, they became banks.
modern problems spring from the 19th century debate. It was then when the problem of fractional reserves and 
money creation out of thin air (under the name of note overissuing at the time) wasn't properly tackled and when the 
idea of a central bank was tried out. The failure of Peel's Act in stopping bank runs and financial crises to happen 
gave the impression that a 100 percent gold reserves system had been an erroneous choice (although in fact the 
system had been functioning with fractional reserves all along).  Moreover, in the current monetary system of fiat 
money and fractional reserves the central banks have found serious grounds to evolve and hold a solid position  
there is a need of lender of last resort. It seems rather difficult to prove the anomalies and costs of a fiat money 
centralised system with fractional reserves that is taken for granted by most of the world. But not implausible or 
impossible.  
The post-crisis economy has to cope with many unsettled issues. Central bankers tried to restart the engine of the 
economy mainly by enlarging the money supply. However, the results are not as ensuring as mainstream economists 
would like us to believe. Topics such as who should hold monopoly over money creation, how this is done through 
the fractional reserve system and how monetary policy impacts the economy were debated during the 19th century 
to some extent. These challenges remain unresolved as the crises keep recurring and should be further researched.  
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